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INTRODUCTION
The decision by the Trump administration to withdraw from the Iran deal and to 
amplify its sanctions regime against Iran, in spite of an international agreement 
to provide Iran a pathway back to normalisation, has demonstrated three things: 
First, just how central the US is to the way the international economic and financial 
system operates; second, just how many policy tools can be deployed in pursuit 
of their agenda; and third, how US thinking on economic warfare—sometimes 
referred to as economic statecraft in more benign times—is staging a comeback 
as an active component in dealing with the wider world. This Strategic Update 
will look at a relatively unused and untested tool available uniquely to the US: 
the dollar as a currency, together with the infrastructure of the global payments 
system through which dollar-based transactions take place. 
The blunt application of various restrictions on the use of the dollar and the global 
payments system in any dealings with Iran has raised fundamental questions for 
other countries; namely, how best to respond to the direct and indirect effects 
of this measure. Among smaller countries, the sense of vulnerability and alarm 
is further heightened by the inability of the EU, Japan, Russia and China to 
effectively circumvent this unilateral US action, or to provide an alternative to 
the dollar system. And if the feeling is that these countries will now have to fend 
for themselves and find their own coping mechanisms, then the global system 
could quickly fragment as countries move to protect themselves from a more 
general breakdown in a global system that has provided the institutional and 
operational architecture for global trade, investment, finance and payments on 
which everyone substantially depends.1
Sanctions on using the dollar have been leveraged in the past against Cuba, 
Russia, North Korea and others, but never with such wide effects. The case of 
North Korea most closely replicates that of Iran, but the scale of the impact is 
altogether different. North Korea is an isolated economy and not really connected 
in any meaningful way to the global economy.
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The Iran case thus takes this practice to an entirely new level 
in several ways. As part of a unilateral US strategy to bring 
Iran into compliance with specific US demands—an action 
which runs counter to an existing and valid international 
agreement—it reflects a breakdown of the UN system. 
Furthermore, the term ‘weaponisation’ is also apt as it 
explains how a relatively neutral but essential facility—the 
dollar and its accompanying payment system—have been 
turned into a powerful weapon by one UN member state 
against another without appropriate sanctions in place. In 
addition to weaponisation, it also represents an aggressive 
form of extraterritoriality which has perhaps not been seen 
on this scale in the past, and was thought to have broadly 
disappeared in the post-war order.
THE WIDER POLICy DEbATE
There are many wider issues engaging the attention of 
policy makers around the world beyond this single concern, 
centring mainly on escalating trade and currency tensions 
and a deteriorating strategic environment with fresh 
controls on international investment flows. This constantly 
shifting landscape makes it difficult to chart a path through 
increasingly apparent risks and challenges—more so for 
smaller countries that have a limited range of policy tools to 
deploy in response.2
At a systemic level, debates about the centrality of the US to 
the global system have been revived, and ideas about finding 
alternative approaches to coordinating global economic, 
financial and trade activity are engaging policy makers 
around the world. But as prospects of redesigning the entire 
global system—a process that would have to include the 
US—are inconceivable at the moment, the only option left is 
to consider national or regional policy measures that could 
limit exposure to whatever happens next. 
Within the US the debate mirrors international concerns but 
from an altogether different perspective. The question for 
them is whether providing an international reserve currency 
is either sustainable or desirable. Here again there are two 
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perspectives, one stemming from the 
strategic leverage of providing this system 
(positive), to the economic cost of doing 
so (negative).3
This paper will focus on smaller countries, 
exploring some of the considerations they 
will have to incorporate into their analyses 
and looking at some of the assumptions 
they have to make. Their situation is 
difficult, to put it mildly. With global policy 
coordination in disarray they will need 
to depend on finding powerful friends, 
creating regional arrangements or building 
new models of self-sufficiency. None of 
these options are as productive—from an 
economic point of view—as the present 
arrangement. Politically this would give 
rise to new forms of dependency, creating 
the conditions for a revival of spheres of 
influence and big power rivalries, both 
of which are natural pre-conditions for 
future conflict. 
COUNTRIES IN FOCUS
The situation and perspective of each 
country is unique, so generalising about 
the lines of active thinking is of limited use 
when trying to identify national options. 
Nevertheless, the overall situation is 
instructive in terms of how policy responses 
could unfold and the wider effects that 
these national actions may have. 
My focus will be on smaller economies, 
excluding most Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
members and China, but including Mexico 
and Turkey. OECD members are excluded 
because they have currencies that are by 
and large fully convertible and freely tradable 
at market rates; and China because it needs 
to be considered in a category of its own.
Other large emerging economies are 
included because they are still relatively 
small in global terms, or vulnerable in other 
areas. Though obviously a very rough 
and imprecise measure, my idea is to 
consider countries that share one or more 
of the following:
 ■ Are very heavily dependent on the 
dollar either because of trade (mainly 
in oil and minerals), investment, debt 
or currency management strategies;
 ■ Do not have strength in depth in the 
financial services sector, and are 
barely present in global financial 
services markets;
 ■ Still have currency controls, even if 
they have been planning to remove 
these as they integrate globally (but 
excluding China);
 ■ Are very small, and dependent 
on trading or political relations to 
manage essentials of food and 
energy supplies in particular. Small, 
isolated island nations and poorly 
connected landlocked states often fall 
into this category.
Some countries belong to more than one 
of these categories, which reflects a more 
complex dependency not only on the dollar 
but on other critical relationships as well. 
All of these factors are likely to come into 
play assuming that the weaponisation 
of the dollar starts to cause growing levels 
of instability.
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ISSUES TO CONSIDER
To understand the parameters of this 
discussion, we also need to clarify how 
monetary policy differs from sanctions, and 
why it is that the sanctions process is the 
one that weaponises the dollar in the present 
situation, even as its effects flow through 
channels created by monetary policy. 
In the US, monetary policy is set by 
the Federal Reserve, which acts on its 
congressional mandate for price stability 
and full employment. Price stability can 
mean three things: interest rates to contain 
inflation, money supply to keep supply and 
demand in balance, and exchange rate 
management to keep the international value 
of the dollar stable. None of these have 
been weaponised, though they have been 
used to stimulate economic activity (for 
example through interest rate reductions 
and quantitative easing), which can have 
significant (benign and harmful) spillover 
effects. It is hard to weaponise monetary 
policy in these circumstances, and the US 
Federal Reserve has not done so, though 
President Trump has made occasional 
references to weaponising international 
dollar values in the context of providing 
monetary policy backing to his trade wars 
with China and the EU.4
The monetary policy of other countries does 
not matter to the same extent, even where 
they have full convertibility. Compared to 
dollar usage, which accounts for more than 
60 percent of global contracts, the footprint 
of other currencies in global markets is far 
more limited. The euro comes next at about 
22–24 percent, with others (the yen, sterling, 
Swiss franc) all in single figures. Monetary 
policy is even more limited in its global impact 
in countries that do not have convertible 
currencies, or which manage with reference 
to the dollar. However, it is relevant where 
it relates to currency convertibility, setting 
international exchange rates and deciding 
on the currencies in which it prefers to hold 
reserves. One legacy of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates (1944–1971) 
is that most countries continued to trade, 
borrow, invest and operate in US dollars, and 
to use US financial institutions to do so.
Sanctions, on the other hand, provide 
authority to the executive to pursue a 
strategic objective. They criminalise or 
penalise anyone who uses the dollar, 
financial institutions with a legal presence in 
the US, or the international payments system 
(SWIFT), which is owned by a consortium of 
US banks. Sanctions in the Iranian situation 
include denial of access to the dollar system 
as a means of stifling investment, trade and 
international transfers. Sanctions also cover 
other international transactions, so a dollar 
sanction also needs to be understood in its 
broader context.
DEvELOPING-COUNTRy 
PERSPECTIvES
Seen from the perspective of some 
developing countries, the global system has 
shifted significantly over the years away 
from reflecting their concerns and towards 
the interests of larger economies. With the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the 
United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), and the group of 77 (a coalition of 
134 developing nations) never able to play 
their anticipated role in shaping the policy 
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agenda in the formative years of the UN system—nor in 
developing alternative economic models—control over 
the global economic agenda first shifted dramatically 
towards the IMF (in the aftermath of the debt crisis and 
then following the collapse of communism), and then 
towards the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
institutionalisation of market-based systems. 
With the OECD providing the intellectual firepower to 
guide the overall process, the political leverage of the 
larger economies—mainly the g7—effectively forced 
their economic and political model on much (but not all) 
of the rest of the world. Still more potent groupings then 
emerged to deal with the financial crisis (the G20 and the 
Financial Stability Board). It is this loose grouping  of like-
minded nations that is now fragmenting in the aftermath 
of unilateral US actions.
The model that created the basis for the extraordinary 
phase of globalisation from 1995 to 2016 incorporated 
the need for open investment regimes, trade liberalisation, 
currency convertibility and a globally integrated financial 
services sector into a unified package that had to be 
adopted as a whole, or at least in phases. It is this model, 
with its unpredictable distributive effects, that Trump is 
essentially dismantling in pursuit of a narrow mercantilist 
and strategic agenda. 
US mONETARy POLICy  
OvER TImE
Through all of these phases, the US Federal Reserve 
was very restrained in its currency and monetary 
management decisions, and was mindful of its global 
responsibility, even as it was constrained by its national 
mandate. In parallel with this, US administrations were 
also aware of the importance of preserving the credibility 
of the dollar by limiting its deployment as a weapon. 
While other countries sought to manage their currencies 
with reference to the dollar, especially after 1971 when 
the fixed exchange rate system collapsed, the Federal 
Reserve largely ignored these interventions, seeing them 
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as short-term ameliorative measures that 
were inevitable in the way the system had 
evolved since 1971. Moreover, they were 
too marginal to affect the value or status of 
the dollar, particularly as larger economies 
moved towards full currency convertibility, 
applying exchange rate management 
systems that were largely consistent 
with the US model.
One consequence of this arrangement 
was that the dollar was viewed not just as 
a market-determined reference point in its 
function as a store of value, but as a safe 
currency in which to hold and transact 
business. With growing economic and trade 
liberalisation, international institutions such 
as the IMF and the World Bank built policy 
advice around assumptions of a stable 
and dependable dollar system, with other 
reference currencies in the same basket. 
Indeed, the removal of capital and currency 
controls, especially from the 1990s onwards, 
were predicated on these assumptions 
remaining valid. 
The conflict between domestic 
mandate requirements and international 
responsibilities did precipitate an economic 
crisis on occasion. Perhaps the most 
dramatic was when the Federal Reserve 
raised interest rates in 1982 (from 5.85 
percent to 20 percent) to deal with domestic 
inflation, simultaneously altering the debt 
obligations of many countries that defined 
their debt in dollar terms, and precipitating 
a global debt crisis. One further case is 
worth mentioning: the 1985 Plaza Accord 
which involved coordinated action to push 
the value of the yen up against other major 
currencies. This was seen as a corrective 
rather than a punitive measure. Today, the 
Japanese might not agree with this view.5
generally however, the Federal Reserve was 
aware of its wider obligations and sensitive to 
monetary decisions that could and did affect 
countries around the world. These concerns 
were often discussed and considered in 
established forums like the g20 or the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) and 
the Financial Stability Board. This spirit of 
cooperation was evident in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis in 2008 when the US used 
quantitative easing to stimulate economic 
activity, but actually altered the value and 
availability of the dollar in international 
markets, thus affecting investment flows. 
Nevertheless, and rather unsurprisingly, 
most developing countries started to take 
defensive measures to limit the impact 
of US monetary policy, particularly in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. The events 
of 2013, which saw investments pulled 
out of emerging economies in anticipation 
of higher yields in dollar-denominated 
assets dramatised the wider effects of US 
monetary policy. Some of these measures 
remain in place and could prove significant 
in the event of the Iran (or indeed any other) 
crisis escalating sharply.
On occasion, it is IMF policy rather than US 
monetary policy that precipitates a reaction 
amongst policy makers in smaller countries. 
Asian economies that suffered heavily 
during the Asian financial crisis of 1997 –98 
learnt an important lesson: high levels of 
dollar and international currency reserves 
were needed to insulate economies against 
shocks. While this made perfect sense, it 
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did increase the exposure of these countries (including 
China) to the dollar.6
Taken together, it became increasingly clear that smaller 
economies, while increasingly vulnerable to US monetary 
and dollar management practices, had actually taken 
some measures to insulate their economies from the 
effects of monetary policy. But no one really expected 
the dollar system to be weaponised, and no one has 
really prepared for it. At the same time, these countries 
found their status in the international system steadily 
weakened by the erosion in their diplomatic, political, 
strategic and economic clout. 
UNDERSTANDING THE  
CENTRALITy OF THE DOLLAR TO  
THE GLObAL ECONOmy 
The post-war economic system was built around using 
the dollar and US capital to launch and support economic 
recovery. In return, the US had to commit to managing 
the dollar in accordance with its agreed responsibilities 
under the fixed exchange rate regime, while the rest of 
the (non-communist) world was to move increasingly 
towards an open trade and investment regime with full 
currency convertibility. Thus we talk about the Bretton 
Woods system, which was further strengthened and 
institutionalised with the collapse of communism, the 
creation of the WTO, the accession of China in 2001, and 
many countries moving towards currency convertibility.
Problems of excessive dependence on the dollar were 
recognised during the Bretton Woods negotiations, and 
subsequently in technical analyses that highlighted the 
complexity of managing a currency7 that was used for 
both domestic and international purposes, especially as 
other countries failed to move towards full convertibility. 
The political leverage of a dollar-dependent world was 
also recognised, and critically characterised by Valery 
giscard d’Estaing in 1974 as “an exorbitant privilege”, 
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meaning the US could run trade and fiscal deficits virtually 
without limit, but of course with consequences. 
So the potential to weaponise the dollar was often recognised, 
but the US very rarely moved decisively in that direction. 
Efforts to punish Cuba, isolate the Soviet Union and China, 
and starve communist regimes of funds were an integral part 
of Cold War strategy, but were designed as an alternative 
to armed conflict. Political and military relations were then 
managed to try and avoid war, in anticipation of ultimate 
economic collapse, which happened in the Soviet sphere, but 
not in China. The present strategy of weaponisation seems to 
be designed to provoke a war. 
Although the fixed exchange rate system collapsed in 1971, 
the dollar continued to function as the world’s reserve currency 
used preponderantly in areas of trade and investment, and 
used principally by multinational corporations in their global 
operations. At the same time, the global bond market—the 
largest driving force of global investment and growth—was 
dominated by dollar-denominated assets, the bulk of which 
flowed from US capital markets and US government debt. 
Today, about two-thirds of all dollars in circulation are 
outside the United States, with a similar proportion reflected 
in global trade and investment contracts. Interestingly, oil 
and mineral markets are almost wholly operated in dollars, 
which leaves Iran (and many others) particularly vulnerable 
to dollar weaponisation.
None of the other main currencies comes close to the scale 
and scope of the dollar. The euro, yen, sterling and others 
collectively account for about 38 percent of global debt and 
global transactions, with the euro further constrained by the 
absence of a Europe-wide bond market.
In parallel with the use of the dollar in trade, investment, 
borrowing and contracts, a huge and complex financial 
architecture has developed around being able to provide this 
service. This mainly consists of global financial institutions, 
payment and interbank transfer systems (SWIFT), and 
internet-based companies (mainly based in the US), which 
are all either registered in the US or are heavily committed 
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to the US market and therefore unwilling 
to disengage to preserve a service for a 
relatively small economy (Iran).8
Briefly stated, therefore, countries or 
entities fall within the jurisdiction of US 
authorities if they:
 ■ Use the dollar in transactions,
 ■ Want to access the US bond 
or stock market,
 ■ Use US-registered financial institutions 
of any sort as intermediaries,
 ■ Use US interbank payment systems,
 ■ Use US-based internet servers 
of IT facilities,
 ■ If US-registered intellectual property is 
involved and licensed, 
 ■ If any US commercial entities 
are involved, or
 ■ If US nationals are involved.
But the system of sanctions goes further. 
Violation also occurs if a third-party entity 
has a registered presence in the US or 
if their actions (as with Cuba) affect the 
interests or assets of US entities. The 
extent and nature of these violations would 
differ from sanction to sanction and are 
almost impossible to fully understand for 
any company operating globally.
Taken together, these conditions cover 
practically every trade transaction, 
investment measure, financial transfer, 
interstate relationship or corporate activity 
in the world. Circumvention without entering 
some form of US jurisdiction is almost 
impossible, which is why EU companies 
find it so difficult to trade with or invest in 
Iran. The US is central to the global financial 
services system in terms of the currency 
used, the financial institutions that conduct 
activities, and the technological platforms 
involved. The weaponisation of the dollar 
system can be hugely destructive to anyone 
directly targeted, and hugely damaging 
to everyone else.
A couple additional points need to be 
mentioned here. The first is that the 
legitimacy of international sanctions is 
supposed to flow from the UN, and not 
from unilateral actions. Indeed, the UN 
Charter makes a presumption of good 
relations as one of its main principles for 
membership. good relations together with 
collective security imply that no individual 
state is to take the law into its own hands. 
This arrangement has clearly broken down.
The second point is that US sanctions in 
the case of Iran are in direct conflict with 
the Iran deal, which is an internationally 
recognised agreement and thus legally 
binding on all UN member states—even 
those not party to the agreement. This 
too represents a major breach in the 
international system. The problem is that 
the status of the US makes it impossible to 
rectify the situation.
POLICy OPTIONS FOR  
DEvELOPING COUNTRIES
Although the weaponisation of the dollar 
is the culmination of a fairly long process, 
most countries seem to assume that it 
is an aberration and things will return to 
normal over time, especially given the 
inconsistency and unpredictability of US 
policy moves. But increasing trade friction 
between the US and China (whether actual 
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or rhetorical), tensions with Iran, Russia, 
North Korea, Cuba and Venezuela, and the 
simultaneous weaponisation of other policy 
instruments—investment rules, technology 
controls, etc.—tend to confirm that the US 
is arming itself for some sort of general 
showdown. Add in the current ambiguity in 
US relations with the EU, and the implications 
become more serious for other countries 
around the world, even if only indirectly. 
While the larger economies with big internal 
markets, convertible currencies and large 
dollar reserves will develop strategies to 
counter dollar weaponisation, it is smaller 
countries that need to think about their 
exposure to these risks. 
One thing the Asian financial crisis and the 
2008/9 financial crisis taught global policy 
makers is that there are multiple channels 
through which an economic crisis in one 
system engulfs a wider region and ultimately 
the global economy, while assuming various 
new forms along the way. These same 
channels could be the pathways down 
which dollar weaponisation transmits its 
wider effects. At the same time, there is 
no precedent for a reserve currency being 
weaponised in this way and on this scale, 
so the policy response may have to evolve 
through trial and error. 
There are also no policy measures currently 
available to the IMF or other institutions to 
guide policy makers; on the contrary, these 
institutions have built-in assumptions that 
major convertible currencies—and the 
dollar in particular—would be managed 
with reference to stability concerns and 
not wielded as a weapon of war. Traditional 
methods of insulating economies 
against currency and trade risks, whether 
political or economic, will need to be 
extensively reviewed. 
Beyond the nature of the response, there is 
the issue of the form that this will take. Do 
they work with like-minded countries and if 
so which are these? Do they use established 
combinations—like the g77—or established 
institutions to express their concerns in a 
quest for a solution? If the latter, they need 
to deal with a deep systemic reality: the US 
is central to all these institutions.
Many countries could find themselves in 
an exposed, isolated and helpless situation, 
hoping that nothing will happen and 
deeply unprepared—individually or through 
appeal to international institutions—if 
anything does. The available alternatives 
to  relatively new institutions, such as the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
carry other political risks, many of which are 
untested and difficult to assess, 
Policy responses will likely come in five 
principal areas: monetary, fiscal, trade, 
investment and domestic economic 
management. Taken together, and if 
these policies are truly defensive in scope 
and application, we will be looking at the 
complete reversal of a process that has been 
in train since the end of the Second World 
War, namely global economic integration 
and interdependency. 
We can get a sense of what could be 
involved in each policy area by looking 
at the assortment of policy measures 
that may be activated many of which 
were prevalent before the 1980s. 
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monetary
 ■ Diversification of reserves away 
from the dollar
 ■ Stockpiling of gold, silver and 
aluminium in particular
 ■ Reintroduction of capital and 
currency controls
 ■ Currency swaps
 ■ Active use of interest rates and 
monetary policy to stabilise and 
stimulate the economy
Fiscal
 ■ Reduction in international borrowing 
and diversification away from dollar-
denominated debt
 ■ Expansionary fiscal policies to fill the 
gap in infrastructure spending, domestic 
consumption and growth requirements
 ■ Higher taxes to pay for this
Trade
 ■ Increasing indifference to WTO rules 
and their national application
 ■ Quantitative restrictions 
on consumer goods
 ■ greater use of national 
security exemptions
 ■ Deviations and exceptions to IP 
protections on national security and 
public health grounds
 ■ Closing public procurement to 
international providers
 ■ greater use of regulatory autonomy to 
create national standards and systems
 ■ Special privileges for domestic 
agriculture and the small to medium 
enterprise sector
 ■ Limiting of global banks in the 
domestic economy
 ■ Dismantling the domestic commitments 
to the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS)
 ■ greater and more widespread 
use of subsidies in the domestic 
and export markets
 ■ Export and import licenses
Investment
 ■ growing use of national security 
considerations in approving 
international investments and mergers 
and acquisitions
 ■ Selective approach to 
preferred investors and the 
currency of investment
 ■ Revival of technology transfer and local 
supplier conditions (TRIMS)
 ■ Protection and state control of the 
commanding heights of the economy  
(strategic sectors)
 ■ Promotion of state-owned enterprises
Domestic policy management
 ■ Industrial, agricultural and 
services policy initiatives to create 
self-sufficiency
 ■ Weakening of international IP protection 
on national interest/security grounds
 ■ Immigration controls on professional 
and skilled workers
 ■ Emigration controls and de-
recognition of international 
qualifications and degrees
This list is illustrative, and not all countries 
will use all of these policies. However, this 
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will be the direction of travel if the current 
situation with Iran continues and the dollar is 
indeed weaponised—more so if the present 
impasse in US–China relations continues or 
if their relations deteriorate further.
CONCLUSIONS
These measures will come at a huge cost. 
Apart from representing a complete reversal 
of global economic integration, it will lead to 
some or all of the following:
 ■ Capital will be less abundant and more 
expensive, possibly leading to slower 
investment and growth in both the 
government and private sectors;
 ■ Capital controls will need to be 
managed to satisfy balance of 
payments requirements;
 ■ Trade contracts and trade currencies 
will carry higher risks and be more 
expensive to manage;
 ■ The pool of skilled labour will 
diminish over time, possibly eroding 
productivity, while remittance flows 
could also diminish (if everyone does 
the same thing);
 ■ Unless well managed, the process 
could lead to a disorderly restructuring 
of domestic economies, especially in 
sectors active in global markets. For 
some countries this will be in industrial 
and agricultural commodities and raw 
materials, while for others it may be in 
merchandise trade. For some it could 
be in both areas;
 ■ Recourse to international institutional 
borrowing (from the IMF/World Bank) 
will become more difficult with the US 
possibly hostile to supporting bailouts 
and debt restructuring, so countries will 
need to build their reserves (as in much 
of Asia) and make sure they never run a 
deficit (as in the case of Taiwan).
Beyond these measures, which are likely 
to kick in through tentative steps and 
pass through various stages, debates will 
develop around new models for economic 
development which would resonate with 
the debates of the 1960s and 1970s. Also 
to be noted is that many economists and 
policy analysts think that globalisation has 
gone too far and that some or all of these 
measures are needed in any case to restore 
sanity to the way national economies are 
managed, and the priorities they pursue. 
This is a powerful view held within many 
developing countries—especially when 
considering the effects of globalisation on 
equality—and is increasingly commonly held 
by environmentalists and conservationists.9
As countries come to terms with a new reality, 
political relationships will be redefined. 
Strategic friendships will be sought in order 
to mitigate some of the risks, particularly for 
economies dependent on food or energy. 
This in turn will create a new pattern of 
interdependencies that will operate largely 
outside current global frameworks and 
will possibly develop rules, practices and 
procedures that are inconsistent with other 
international obligations. The WTO system, 
for example, would crumble completely in 
the face of this happening.
And within the US debates about the future 
of the dollar as a global reserve currency 
will only add to the uncertainty and perhaps 
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precipitate a larger crisis as old certainties 
give way to new fears.
All this just from the weaponisation of 
the dollar? Perhaps it is overstated, but if 
the effects on the Iranian economy start 
to impinge on the economic wellbeing of 
other countries, and affects their balance 
of payments, we will see the first stages 
of this scenario unfolding. Perhaps it will 
be with the reintroduction of capital and 
currency controls.  
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NOTES
1 John Plender in his piece on Market Insight, “Mercantilist cat out of bag heralds new 
world order for financial assets”, in the Financial Times of June 5th 2019, makes this 
point through an exploration of how markets are reacting.
2 The Economist, in its Leader on “Weapons of mass disruption”,  p.13, June 8th-14th 
2019 summarises some of these broader concerns and implications.
3  James Politi, in his piece in the Financial Times, of 1st /2nd June 2019, “Fed nominee 
hits at bank’s Soviet-style market power” (p.8 in the FT Weekend), explores this issue 
in his analysis  of the views of Judy Shelton, currently the US representative on 
the board of the European Bank for Reconstruction and development (EBRD), and 
possible nominee for the US Federal Reserve Board of governors.
4 Paul Krugman, “Trumpifying the Fed and our future”, The New York Times 
(International edition), p.1, June 22-23rd, 2019, highlights the wider implications if 
this happens.
5 Sender, H., in the Financial Times, 17th June 2019, “The Weaponisation of the 
dollar risk rebounding on the US” reflects on the longer term effects of dollar 
weaponisation and the harm it could do to the US domestic economy as sanction 
measures actually play out.
6 Smith, J., “On China, Trump needs Europe”, in The New York Times (International 
Edition), p.7, June 13th, 2019.
7 The Triffin Dilemma is often cited in this context, though JM Keynes foresaw much 
the same in broader terms. See Lebowitz, M., “Triffin Warned Us”, in Realinvestment 
Advice.com, April 18th 2019, for more depth and detail.
8 Maharrey, M., SWIFT and the Weaponization of the dollar, from the Foundation for 
Economic Education (FEE), 6th October 2018.
9 Andy Becket in the Long Read in the guardian (25th June 2019) “The new left 
economics: how a network of thinkers is redefining capitalism”, reviews how the 
discipline of economics is being redefined. Full article available at https://www.
theguardian.com/news/2019/jun/25/the-new-left-economics-how-a-network-of-
thinkers-is-transforming-capitalism
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The decision by the Trump administration to withdraw 
from the Iran deal and to amplify its sanctions regime 
against Iran has demonstrated how a relatively unused 
and untested tool available uniquely to the US: the 
dollar as a currency, together with the infrastructure 
of the global payments system, is being weaponised.
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